One Dutch Company Builds the Only Machine That Can Print an Advanced Chip. It Just Said Demand Won't Be Satisfied Through 2028.
Every logic chip advanced enough to matter — Nvidia's, Apple's, Samsung's, even China's own best fabs — is printed by a machine only one company on Earth has ever managed to build: ASML's EUV lithography system. Today ASML reported record Q3 2026 sales of €11.7 billion, up 55% from a year ago, and said the capacity it's already planned to add through 2027 and 2028 still won't fully cover what customers are ordering. In the same report, China's slice of its machine shipments fell from about 42% a year ago to 23% — the clearest sign yet that a 2025 Chinese buying rush is fading just as the AI boom elsewhere accelerates.
Run the queue: can ASML ever build its way out of the backlog?
Set how fast AI-driven chip demand grows each year, then press Run to step through 2024–2028. The blue bar is illustrative machine-building capacity, loosely modeled on ASML's own stated 2026 base (~65 EUV systems) and its guided +30% capacity jumps in 2027 and again in 2028. The orange bar is demand, compounding at your chosen rate. Unmet orders don't vanish — they carry over as backlog, stacked at right. Simplified teaching model, not ASML's real unit counts or forecast.
Ready to run. Pick a demand-growth rate, then press Run to step year by year from 2024 to 2028.
The plain version
There is exactly one company on the planet that can build the machine needed to print the finest circuits on an advanced computer chip. It's called ASML, it's Dutch, and it makes something called an EUV lithography machine. Nobody else has managed to build a working one — Japan's Nikon tried for close to two decades and gave up. Each ASML machine is roughly the size of a double-decker bus, weighs about as much as 120 cars, and costs upward of $180 million. Inside, it fires a laser at droplets of molten tin, tens of thousands of times a second, to make an extremely specific kind of light, then bounces that light through a vacuum chamber onto a silicon wafer to etch a pattern finer than a virus. TSMC, Samsung, Intel, and even China's best factories all need this exact machine if they want to make a genuinely advanced chip. There's no second supplier to call.
Today ASML reported its results for the past three months, and two numbers tell the real story. First: it sold a record €11.7 billion worth of machines and services, up 55% from a year earlier, almost entirely riding the AI data-center boom. Second, and more telling: ASML said that even after already planning to expand production through 2027 and 2028, it still won't be able to build enough machines to satisfy everyone who wants one. Its order backlog was already €38.8 billion at the end of last year — more than three years of today's revenue, just waiting to be built.
Meanwhile the destination of those machines is shifting fast. A year ago, China accounted for about 42% of what ASML shipped, largely a stockpiling rush as Chinese chipmakers rushed to buy whatever export rules still allowed before the rules tightened further. This quarter, China's share fell to 23%, with the freed-up machines going largely to Taiwan, South Korea, and the US — the places building the chips an AI boom actually needs.
The expert version
EUV lithography generates 13.5nm-wavelength light by firing a high-power CO₂ laser at a stream of microscopic molten-tin droplets roughly 50,000 times per second; each droplet is vaporized into a plasma that emits EUV radiation. Because EUV is absorbed by virtually all materials, including air and ordinary glass, the entire optical path runs in vacuum and uses multilayer molybdenum-silicon mirrors rather than refractive lenses to steer and focus the light onto the wafer. ASML spent roughly two decades turning this into a production tool, and no competitor — Nikon's own long-running EUV program included — has fielded a commercial rival. ASML's newer High-NA systems (numerical aperture 0.55 vs. 0.33) push resolution further still, but at roughly €350–400 million per unit, uptake among TSMC and Samsung has so far been cautious.
Q3 2026 financials, reported today: total net sales €11.7B (+55% YoY), net system sales €8.4B, installed-base management (service/upgrades) €3.289B, gross margin 57.5%, net income €5.0B. Q4 2026 guidance: €14.2–15.2B; full-year 2026 guidance: €44–45B at roughly 56% gross margin. System-sales destination split: Taiwan 32%, South Korea 31%, China 23%, United States 13%, versus roughly 42% to China in Q3 2025. ASML's order backlog reached €38.8B at the end of Q4 2025, and management reiterated that currently planned 2027 and 2028 capacity additions — on the order of 30% annual increases in Low-NA EUV output — will not fully clear outstanding customer demand.
The China swing reflects export-control mechanics layered on top of ordinary cyclicality. The Netherlands' dual-use export-licensing regime, coordinated with U.S. Entity List restrictions, already bars EUV system sales to China outright and has progressively narrowed which DUV immersion tools can still ship there. 2025's elevated China share (roughly a third of full-year revenue) was substantially front-loaded demand — Chinese fabs buying up still-exportable DUV tools ahead of anticipated further tightening — a surge ASML itself flagged as temporary. That stockpiling cycle is now unwinding toward the company's own full-year 2026 guidance of roughly 20% China revenue share, even as AI-driven EUV and DUV demand from Taiwan, Korea, and the US continues to outrun planned capacity.
Why it matters for tech + supply chain: One company's annual build schedule is now the de facto rationing mechanism for the entire advanced chip industry — and its quarterly numbers are turning into one of the clearest live readouts of whether the AI boom or the US-China chip war is moving faster.
Why it matters for tech + supply chain: With a single, non-substitutable supplier sitting at the top of the stack, EUV allocation functions as an exogenous capacity constraint on the whole leading-edge semiconductor industry; its regional sales mix is also one of the most liquid, frequently updated proxies available for how export controls are actually reshaping chipmaking capacity between the US, its allies, and China.