China Refines 79% of the World's Cobalt. The Country That Mines 73% of It Just Banned Shipping the Raw Rock Out.
Nearly three-quarters of the world's mined cobalt comes out of the ground in one country, and almost none of it leaves that country refined. This August, the Democratic Republic of Congo moved to close that gap by law — banning the export of raw copper and cobalt concentrate outright, unless a miner can secure a one-year waiver. Whether that actually relocates where the world's EV and phone batteries get their cobalt refined depends on a capacity problem Congo hasn't solved yet.
Drive the chokepoint: what happens when the border closes to raw ore
A simplified model, not real reported tonnages: each month, Congo's mines produce a fixed batch of ore. Toggle whether the mines ministry grants a waiver letting unrefined concentrate leave anyway, then press Run. Grant waivers and ore keeps flowing straight out, same as always. Deny them and ore can only leave as fast as Congo's own, much smaller refining capacity allows — everything else queues at the border. Mine output and refining capacity below are illustrative placeholders sized to show the gap reporting describes, not measured rates.
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The plain version
Every lithium-ion battery that needs extra range or extra life — most EVs, a lot of laptops and phones — uses cobalt to keep the chemistry stable. Almost three-quarters of the world's cobalt comes out of the ground in one country: the Democratic Republic of Congo. But Congo barely refines any of it. For decades, miners there have dug up cobalt ore, done just enough processing to concentrate it into a transportable material, and shipped that raw product out — overwhelmingly to China, which turns roughly four out of every five tonnes of the world's mined cobalt into the battery-grade chemicals that actually go into a cell. Congo gets paid for digging. China gets paid for the harder, more valuable step of refining it.
Congo's government has been trying to change that math for years, with mixed results. In 2025 it banned cobalt exports outright for several months to stop a price crash, then replaced the ban with a quota system that still lets ore leave, just capped. This past August it took a sharper step: it banned exporting copper and cobalt concentrate — the raw, barely processed material — at all, unless a miner gets a special one-year waiver. The stated goal is to force companies to build, or use, refining capacity inside Congo first, so the country captures more of the profit instead of shipping its ore to someone else's smelters.
The catch: Congo doesn't yet have enough refining capacity to process what its mines dig up. So right now the rule works less like a wall and more like a toll booth handing out a lot of exceptions — a tension the simulation above lets you drive yourself.
The expert version
The structural chokepoint: the Cobalt Institute's 2025 market report puts the DRC's share of global mined cobalt at 73% (down from 77% in 2024 as new supply ramps up in Indonesia and elsewhere), while China's share of global refined cobalt output was 79% the same year. The gap between those two figures is the trade this story is about — concentrate and cobalt hydroxide/sulphide intermediates (MHP/MCP) move from Congolese mines to Chinese smelters and refineries, which convert them into cobalt sulfate and cobalt metal for battery cathode-precursor makers.
Congo's regulator, ARECOMS, closed a four-month export ban in mid-2025 (triggered by metal prices that had fallen below roughly $10/lb) by replacing it with annual export quotas: a 2026 base allocation of 96,600 tonnes of contained cobalt (87,000t distributed pro rata to individual producers, 9,600t held in a discretionary strategic reserve), with the regime nominally running through the end of 2027 and unused allocations subject to forfeiture and reallocation. Analyst estimates cited by Fastmarkets put 2026 global cobalt supply at roughly 214,000–216,000 tonnes against demand of 221,000–231,000 tonnes — a structural deficit even with quotas in place, part of why cobalt metal, below $10/lb before the 2025 ban, was trading near $25–26/lb through most of 2026.
On June 29, 2026, DRC's mines, foreign-trade and economy ministers signed a further order — effective August 6 — prohibiting the export of copper and cobalt concentrates specifically, repealing a 2023 framework that had granted standing exemptions, and replacing it with a system under which the mines minister may grant one-year "strategic" waivers case by case. Exposure is uneven: Glencore and Ivanhoe Mines' Kamoa-Kakula complex, which export concentrate, face more direct pressure than CMOC, the world's single largest cobalt producer, whose Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu operations already output cobalt hydroxide rather than raw concentrate. ARECOMS's chairman said in early October that quota volumes aren't being changed for now, given recent price softening — leaving the concentrate ban, not the quota, as the active lever on where the next refining capacity gets built.
Why it matters for tech + supply chain: Every EV and most phone or laptop batteries run on cobalt that Congo digs up and China refines — and Congo just moved to keep more of that refining step for itself.
Why it matters for tech + supply chain: Battery-grade cobalt chemistry remains bottlenecked at refining, not mining — and Congo's concentrate ban is the first serious attempt to relocate that step away from China's smelters, with uneven effects across Glencore, Ivanhoe and CMOC.