China Refines Up to 80% of the World's Antimony. Washington's One-Year Truce to Keep Buying It Expires in 26 Days.
Antimony is the metal nobody names — it hardens bullets, keeps backup batteries from buckling, and stops wiring insulation from catching fire. China doesn't just mine a lot of it; it refines most of the world's supply. A year ago, Beijing paused its ban on selling antimony to the U.S. That pause expires November 27.
Drag from "at the mine" to "at the refinery"
A simplified model of where world antimony supply sits today. Left end: estimated share of 2025 mined tonnage (USGS). Right end: estimated share of global refining capacity (industry estimates, which range roughly 75–89% for China depending on source — this model uses 80%). Figures are illustrative midpoints of reported ranges, not a single precise source.
The plain version
You've probably never heard of antimony, but it's quietly load-bearing. Mixed into lead, it hardens the grids inside backup batteries — the kind that keep data centers, cell towers and hospitals running when the power blinks. Mixed into plastic and wire coatings as antimony trioxide, it's a flame retardant that keeps cables and circuit boards from igniting. Mixed into lead for bullets and shell casings, it's in more than 200 types of U.S. ammunition. It even shows up inside infrared sensors used in night-vision and heat-seeking equipment.
Here's the catch: almost nobody outside China actually turns raw antimony ore into usable metal anymore. China mines roughly a third of the world's supply — Russia and Tajikistan dig up most of the rest — but then much of that ore gets shipped to China anyway, because China built the smelters. Estimates vary, but China is thought to control somewhere between three-quarters and nearly all of global refining capacity, depending on whose number you trust.
In December 2024, Beijing responded to U.S. tech export curbs by banning antimony sales (plus a few other obscure but important metals) to America. Then, after Presidents Trump and Xi met in South Korea last October, China agreed to pause that specific ban for a year — a goodwill gesture, not a repeal. Licenses are still required for every shipment, and the U.S. military is still shut out entirely.
That one-year pause ends November 27, 2026 — 26 days from today. Nobody in Beijing or Washington has said publicly what happens next. The only serious domestic backup, a mine in Idaho called Stibnite, broke ground a year ago with Pentagon funding behind it, but it isn't expected to produce metal until around 2028. Until then, American battery makers, ammunition plants and electronics manufacturers are, for this one unglamorous metal, dependent on Chinese goodwill renewing itself every twelve months.
The expert version
Antimony (Sb, atomic number 51) is a metalloid whose industrial value comes from a handful of specific compounds and alloys. Lead–antimony alloys (typically 1.5–6% Sb) harden the cast grids of standby/VRLA lead-acid batteries used in UPS and telecom backup, improving charge retention and structural rigidity versus pure-lead grids (at the cost of faster grid corrosion over the battery's life). Antimony trioxide (Sb₂O₃) is the standard synergist paired with halogenated flame retardants in PVC wire insulation, circuit-board laminates and plastic enclosures, and separately serves as a fining/clarifying agent in optical and solar glass. Antimony trisulfide and antimony-hardened lead are used across primers, tracers and ammunition — the Pentagon reportedly specifies it in 200-plus munition types. Antimonide III–V compounds (notably indium antimonide, InSb) are narrow-bandgap semiconductors used in infrared detectors for thermal imaging and missile seekers.
On supply: the USGS's 2026 Mineral Commodity Summary puts 2025 world mine production at roughly 110,000 tonnes (down from about 119,000 in 2024), with China at an estimated 36% of that — a figure that itself has been revised down from earlier editions, which had put China's share closer to 48–60% in prior years; treat any single mine-share percentage as approximate. Russia (≈29%) and Tajikistan (≈20%) account for most of the remainder. Mining share meaningfully understates China's leverage, however, because China also imports concentrate from Russia, Tajikistan, Myanmar and Bolivia and smelts it domestically; estimates of China's share of global refining capacity range from roughly 74% to 80% in most trade sources, with one industry tally putting China plus Russia combined near 89% — sources disagree enough that this should be read as a wide, not precise, estimate.
In December 2024, China's Ministry of Commerce added antimony, gallium, germanium, graphite and superhard materials to its dual-use export control catalog and barred US-bound shipments. Following the late-October 2025 Trump–Xi meeting in Busan, MOFCOM suspended the antimony (and gallium/germanium) ban specifically for US buyers for 12 months, effective November 2025, while keeping the licensing requirement in force and explicitly excluding military end-users. That suspension expires November 27, 2026. Spot antimony trioxide prices, which spiked toward roughly $50,000/tonne in late 2025 amid the restrictions, have since eased — reported figures for mid-2026 cluster in the high-$20,000s to low-$30,000s/tonne, though quoted prices vary by grade and source. Perpetua Resources' Stibnite Gold project in Idaho — the only permitted US antimony deposit, backed by over $90 million in combined Department of Defense awards — broke ground in October 2025 but is not expected to produce antimony concentrate until roughly 2028, leaving the US import-dependent through the deadline and well beyond it.
Why it matters for tech + supply chain: Almost all of it gets refined in one country, and the goodwill letting it reach the U.S. runs out in 26 days.
Why it matters for tech + supply chain: Refining concentration, not mining concentration, is the real single point of failure — and it sits underneath backup power, flame-retardant cabling and the defense-industrial base all at once.