China Refines an Estimated 93.5% of the World's Solar Panel Silicon. Its Own Antitrust Regulator Just Blocked the Industry's Fix for the Price Crash It Caused.
Nearly every solar panel on Earth starts life as a chunk of ultra-pure silicon refined in China — a concentration tighter than almost any chokepoint this newsletter has covered. Years of overbuilding left producers selling it for less than it costs to make. In December, six of them tried to fix that by paying each other to shut a third of the industry down. Beijing's own competition watchdog said no.
The standoff: why nobody cuts alone
Drag the slider to have GCL — one producer, highlighted below — idle its own output. Then flip the toggle to see what happens if rivals matched the cut instead, the way the banned fund would have worked. Illustrative model: assumes the world needs ~65% of installed capacity running to clear demand (producers' own estimate of the "idle a third" fix) and an $8.50/kg cash cost; real prices and company shares vary and these are not exact figures.
The plain version
Almost every solar panel made on Earth begins the same way: as sand turned into ultra-pure silicon, called polysilicon, inside a handful of giant Chinese factories. An outside research firm estimates China now produces 93.5% of the world's supply, and nine of the ten biggest producers on the planet are Chinese companies most people outside the industry have never heard of — Tongwei, GCL, Daqo, Xinte, and a long tail of smaller rivals.
Here's the problem: they built way too many factories. During the solar boom, everyone expanded at once, and by last year there was so much silicon sloshing around that companies were selling it for less than it cost to make — like a dozen gas stations flooding one small town, then racing each other to the bottom on price just to keep cash coming in.
So the biggest players tried the obvious fix: pool roughly $7 billion, buy out about a third of the country's capacity, and shut it down together so prices could recover. China's own antitrust regulator said absolutely not — that's a cartel, and it's illegal even for companies trying to rescue each other, not just gouge customers. So in October, the same companies crept back into a closed-door meeting and tried a softer, unenforceable version: a "please don't sell below this price" pledge. Few expect it to hold, because any single company that quietly ignores the pledge and keeps selling wins market share while everyone else loses money for nothing.
Solar panels are one of the fastest ways to add power to a grid that AI data centers are straining hard. Whatever happens in that Chinese price war eventually shows up in how fast, and how cheaply, the world can build new electricity.
The expert version
Solar-grade polysilicon is produced mainly via the Siemens process: metallurgical-grade silicon reacts with hydrogen chloride to form trichlorosilane gas, which is purified by fractional distillation and deposited, layer by layer, onto heated silicon rods inside sealed bell-jar reactors until it reaches roughly 6N (99.9999%) purity — distinct from the 9N+ "electronic grade" polysilicon semiconductor fabs require, which runs through a related but separate supply chain (Wacker, Shin-Etsu, Hemlock). China's solar-grade capacity is now estimated at roughly 93.5% of global 2024 output (Bernreuter Research), with the top four producers — Tongwei, GCL Technology, Daqo New Energy, and Xinte Energy — alone accounting for about 65%.
Capacity additions from 2021–2023, chasing a demand supercycle, left China with far more polysilicon capacity than the global panel market could absorb, pushing transaction prices below most producers' cash costs for an extended stretch. In December 2025, six major producers set up a stockpiling vehicle intending to raise roughly RMB 50 billion (~$7B) to acquire and idle about a third of national capacity — a structure that functions economically like a buyout cartel. On January 6, 2026, China's State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) summoned the China Photovoltaic Industry Association and the major producers and prohibited any agreement touching output volumes, capacity, pricing, quotas, profit-sharing, or the exchange of competitively sensitive data — applying China's own Anti-Monopoly Law against coordination among its own strategic manufacturers, not against a foreign target.
Lacking an enforceable mechanism, the industry reverted to a non-binding "self-discipline" pact in August 2026 and, on October 11, to a closed-door meeting in Hangzhou among eight producers controlling roughly 90% of China's capacity, proposing a tax-inclusive floor price of CNY 43,000/tonne (~$6,324/t, ~$6.32/kg) for conventional Siemens-process material, alongside peer monitoring for below-cost sales. Reported figures put September output near 120,400 tonnes with an October target near 105,000 tonnes as most producers cut and a couple restarted. Without legal enforcement, this is a textbook collective-action problem: any single firm that defects and keeps output high captures share while the price barely moves, so compliance tends to erode exactly when the industry most needs it to hold.
Why it matters for tech + supply chain: Solar panels are among the fastest ways to add grid power for AI data centers, and almost all of their silicon comes from Chinese producers mid-price-war that Beijing itself won't let collude to fix.
Why it matters for tech + supply chain: The same collective-action failure keeping Chinese polysilicon margins negative also bounds how much new hyperscale power demand solar can absorb at today's panel-cost line; a price floor that actually holds would show up within quarters inside utility-scale solar PPAs.